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Terminating the Hospital-Physician
Employment Relationship: Navigating
Conflicts Arising from the Physician’s Dual
Roles as Employee and Medical Staff
Member
Gayland O. Hethcoat II *
In an effort to meet the challenges of the post-health reform
marketplace, hospitals have accelerated the practice of
employing physicians. Despite this trend, many hospitals require
their employed physicians to also maintain membership and
privileges on the medical staff—the self-governing entity
comprised of fellow physicians that oversees the practice of
medicine within the hospital setting. Recent case law identifies at
least two salient issues that will likely arise from physicians’
dual roles as hospital employee and medical staff member and
be a point of negotiation and litigation: (1) the applicability of
“due process” rights, which are typically afforded in medical
staff peer review actions, to employment termination actions,
and (2) the obligation to report employment termination actions
to the federal government’s National Practitioner Data Bank, a
central database for information about medical staff peer review
actions and other incidents that may reflect on physicians’
competence and quality of care. This article examines how and
why these issues may become points of contention and proposes
various practical solutions to avoiding or mitigating such
conflicts.
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Five years after passage of the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA), 1
hospital employment of physicians remains one of the most frequently
cited strategies for hospitals and physicians to meet the challenges of the
post-health reform marketplace. Many health industry analysts opine that
the employment relationship offers a template for hospitals and
physicians to align their operations and financial interests and thus
position themselves to meet greater demand for high-quality, costefficient care, as reflected in various initiatives in the ACA, such as its
Medicare reform measure involving “accountable care organizations”
(ACOs). 2 Although the full impact of hospital employment of physicians
is unseen, one observation is readily apparent: The increase in hospital
employment of physicians further hastens the demise of the voluntary
medical staff model—the traditional paradigm of hospital-physician
relations. 3
Under the voluntary medical staff model, private-practice physicians,
aggregated together as the medical staff, operate on a mostly independent
basis within a hospital’s confines, subject to the rules in the medical
staff’s bylaws and administrative oversight by the hospital’s governing
body. By definition, the employment model confers hospitals with a
degree of control over physicians—control they would not otherwise
have under the voluntary medical staff model. Nevertheless, many
hospitals preserve the traditional medical staff structure and require their
employed physicians to also maintain membership and privileges on the
medical staff. This overlap naturally invites questions about the
1

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
2
See EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 224–30 (2014)
(discussing Medicare-participating ACOs).
3
See Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Hospital-Physician Relations: Two Tracks and the
Decline of the Voluntary Medical Staff Model, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1311–12 (2008).
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interrelationship between the physician’s roles as hospital employee and
as member of the hospital’s medical staff. 4
For all its potential, the continued growth of hospital employment of
physicians will inevitably bring with it a greater share of relationships
that do not work out and end in termination. Recent case law identifies at
least two salient issues that will likely be a point of negotiation and
litigation regarding physician employment arrangements: (1) the
applicability of “due process” rights, which are typically afforded in
medical staff peer review actions, to employment termination actions,
and (2) the obligation to report employment termination actions to the
federal government’s National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), a central
database for information about medical staff peer review actions and
other incidents that may reflect on physicians’ competence and quality of
care. 5 These issues have long been major points of contention within
medical staff peer review law, but the overlay of the employment
relationship on the medical staff affiliation requires looking at them
anew.
This article examines how and why termination of a physician’s
employment with a hospital may trigger conflicts regarding due process
and NPDB reporting and proposes various practical solutions to avoiding
or mitigating these conflicts. To put this discussion in context, this article
begins with an overview of the market forces that are driving more
physicians to become hospital employees and more hospitals to become
physician employers. An analysis of the legal disputes over due process
and NPDB reporting that may emerge from physicians’ concurrent roles
as hospital employee and medical staff member follows. Finally, this
article suggests how hospitals and physicians alike can minimize these
disputes by ensuring clarity and precision in negotiating and drafting
physician employment agreements and in carrying out termination
decisions.

I.

THE EVOLVING PHENOMENON OF HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT
OF PHYSICIANS

Physicians have historically enjoyed a level of respect and prestige
that few others in society command. Such reverence, however, does not
come free, premised as it is on the notion that, as licensed professionals
who have undergone years of rigorous training, physicians will always
act independently in the best interests of their patients, regardless of their
self-interests or the interests of others who stand to benefit from the
4
5

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
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patient-physician relationship. Numerous sources of law codify and
make explicit this implicit promise, as, for example, the doctrine in many
jurisdictions that prohibits the “corporate practice of medicine” (subject
to the common exception that hospitals may employ physicians without
violating this prohibition, as discussed below).6 Likewise, protection of
physician independence undergirds many laws regulating hospital
operations, such as state hospital licensing laws and the Medicare
conditions of participation requiring hospitals to maintain a selfgoverning medical staff, which adheres to a set of bylaws. 7
Traditionally, under the voluntary medical staff model recognized by
law, the local community hospital was the “physician’s workshop.”8 That
is, the hospital was a place where physicians could access equipment and
staff to perform procedures and provide services not otherwise available
in their private offices.9 In exchange, physicians would serve in
leadership roles on the medical staff and take emergency department call
coverage, usually without pay. 10 For some physicians, contributing their
time and energy to their affiliated hospital was more than just a work
requirement; it was a civic duty. 11
As with so many aspects of healthcare delivery and finance,
however, the nature of hospital-physician relations has not been static. In
the 1990s, many hospitals acquired large numbers of primary care
physicians’ (PCPs) practices and employed the physicians, thinking a
managed care model of capitation payments, based on PCPs acting as
“gatekeepers” for the rest of the healthcare system, would become the
national standard. 12 For physicians, the uncertainty and lower payment
rates offered by managed care organizations, combined with the
generous terms proposed by hospitals, made hospital employment
enticing. 13 But when the capitated model failed to take off as anticipated,
many hospitals divested their employed primary care practices because
they were losing money. 14
Although hospitals’ experiences in the 1990s provided a cautionary
tale, they ultimately did not curb the practice of employing physicians.
6

See infra Part II.A.
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2014) (requiring hospitals, as a condition to
participation in Medicare, to “have an organized medical staff that operates under bylaws
approved by the governing body and is responsible for the quality of medical care
provided to patients by the hospital”).
8
Casalino et al., supra note 3, at 1306.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
7
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Indeed, hospital employment of physicians continued into the 2000s,
during which many hospitals began to employ specialists in addition to
PCPs. 15 Now, more than half of practicing physicians in the United
States are employed by hospitals or integrated healthcare delivery
systems. 16 With its incentives for hospitals, physicians, and other
healthcare providers to further integrate themselves in an effort to cut
costs while improving the quality of their care, 17 the ACA has been a
major contributing factor to the increase in hospital employment of
physicians in more recent years. One such initiative under the ACA
involves recruiting ACOs into the Medicare program with the prospect of
sharing in the cost savings that are anticipated to result from tighter
coordination among providers and an accompanying reduction in
duplicative and unnecessary interventions.18 By design, the ACO concept
is intended to be a flexible one, and, as such, hospital employment of
physicians is one model that may be conducive to achieving its goals,
through such measures as “incentive-driven compensation linked to
productivity and clinical behavior” and reductions in “excess costs
associated with unnecessary practice variation and unnecessarily
expensive supplies selected by physicians.” 19 Although the ACO
program and the risk-based payment approaches codified in the ACA
technically apply only to Medicare and other public payers, they are
poised to be adopted by private payers as well.20
While the ACA has no doubt fostered an environment favorable to
hospital employment of physicians, other, more local factors have played
an important role, too. For hospitals, employing physicians is, at bottom,
a competitive measure, allowing them to reinforce their place within an
existing hospital market or enter into a new one, or preempt competition
from specialist-owned ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), specialty
hospitals, and imaging facilities.21 Relatedly, employing physicians may
15

See id. at 1307–08.
Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians—The
Logic Behind a Money-Losing Proposition, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1790, 1790 (2011).
17
See generally EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 224–30 (discussing various cost-control
measures in the ACA).
18
See id. at 224–28.
19
Kocher & Sahni, supra note 16, at 1792.
20
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter,
Healthier: In Historic Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for Shifting
Medicare Reimbursements from Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), available at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/01/20150126a.html (noting the creation of the Health
Care Payment Learning and Action Network, through which the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services “will work with private payers, employers, consumers,
providers, states and state Medicaid programs, and other partners to expand alternative
payment models into their programs”).
21
See Casalino et al., supra note 3, at 1308.
16

430

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:425

allow hospitals to improve their operations by filling a shortage in a
particular specialty or a gap in emergency department call coverage or
availability for consultation that would otherwise exist. 22 For physicians,
relinquishing the responsibilities of a private practice and becoming a
hospital employee promise “more regular work hours and less frequent
call responsibility, and . . . shelter from an increasingly complex and
unstable market.” 23 In short, hospital employment of physicians can be
both individually and collectively beneficial.
To be sure, not all physicians are opting for hospital employment.
Many physicians have taken the opposite course and become competitors
with hospitals, increasing their ownership in ASCs, specialty hospitals,
and imaging facilities.24 For physicians—mostly specialists, often in
markets that lack a consolidated hospital presence—ownership in these
facilities enables them to increase their efficiency and profitability by
providing a narrow range of procedures and reaping the “facility fee”
payment that hospitals would otherwise receive. 25 Accordingly, these
physicians “may rarely set foot in the hospital.”26 Even private-practice
PCPs and other physicians whose practice is not procedure-based are
becoming more detached from their community hospitals, using
hospitalists (who may be hospital employees) to admit and treat large
numbers of patients rather than assuming call coverage responsibilities. 27
Thus, as one study concluded, a dichotomy is emerging such that
“physicians will increasingly choose the path of hospital employment or
of separation from hospitals, with the two paths coexisting in some
communities, while one path or the other predominates in others.” 28 The
ramifications of this divergence are not yet fully realized, but it at least
appears “[t]he voluntary medical staff model, traditionally the foundation
of physician-hospital relations, [is] entering a period of decline.” 29

II.

NAVIGATING TERMINATION-RELATED CONFLICTS ARISING
FROM THE PHYSICIAN’S DUAL ROLES AS EMPLOYEE AND MEDICAL

STAFF MEMBER
For most hospital-employed physicians, the employment agreement
and medical staff bylaws are the primary authorities that govern their
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See id.
Id. at 1309.
See id. at 1310.
Id.
Id.
Casalino et al., supra note 3, at 1310–11.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1305.
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practice within the hospital. In many ways, the hospital employment
agreement may resemble previous employment agreements to which the
physician was a party, addressing such matters as compensation,
benefits, insurance, and scope of responsibilities. Typically, the
agreement will also require the physician to be a member of the
hospital’s medical staff and maintain appropriate privileges for his or her
practice, and to abide by the medical staff bylaws, rules, and regulations.
Depending on the particular arrangement, the agreement may provide
that termination of employment will result in automatic termination of
the physician’s medical staff membership or privileges, or vice versa.
By contrast, the medical staff bylaws act as a charter that sets forth
the medical staff’s system of governance and the rights and duties of all
medical staff members vis-à-vis the hospital governing body. 30 The
requirement to have medical staff bylaws and to ensure certain content
therein stems from various regulatory sources, including state hospital
licensing laws, federal conditions of hospital participation in Medicare,
and rules from accrediting organizations, such as The Joint
Commission. 31 Although courts have held medical staff bylaws to be
enforceable contracts in some cases, 32 they generally have not held them
to be enforceable employment contracts. 33 Nevertheless, reference to and
incorporation of medical staff bylaws in employment agreements raise
questions as to how the agreement, bylaws, and the laws underlying them
interrelate and which controls in the event of a conflict. Having an
answer to these questions is especially important when the hospitalphysician relationship breaks down and is terminated, and will clarify
both hospitals’ and physicians’ rights and responsibilities.

A.
The Applicability of Medical Staff “Due Process” Rights to
Employment Termination Actions
To appreciate why contentions regarding due process may arise from
a hospital’s termination of a physician’s employment, it is helpful first to
understand why the procedures for terminating, suspending, or taking
other adverse actions against a physician’s medical staff membership or
privileges are themselves the focus of so many legal disputes. As noted,
multiple sources of law and regulation govern the organization and
operation of medical staffs and their bylaws, including the procedures for
30

See KAREN S. RIEGER ET AL., HEALTHCARE ENTITY BYLAWS AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS: NAVIGATING THE MEDICAL STAFF/HEALTHCARE ENTITY RELATIONSHIP
§ 1.1, at 2 (3d ed. 2011).
31
See id. §§ 2.1–2.3, at 5–9.
32
See id. § 3.3, at 26 nn.17–18 (collecting cases).
33
See, e.g., Engelstad v. Va. Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 267 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting
that “[s]taff privileges do not establish an employment contract with the hospital”).
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peer review actions. One such source is the federal Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA). 34 To “balance the chilling effect of
litigation on peer review with concerns for protecting physicians
improperly subjected to disciplinary action,” 35 HCQIA immunizes
hospitals and their medical staffs from liability for damages resulting
from a determination that adversely affects a physician’s standing on a
medical staff, but only if minimum safeguards are in place (usually as set
forth in the medical staff bylaws) to ensure fairness to the physician. 36
Thus, in lawsuits in which physicians seek damages arising from peer
review actions (often on contractual, tortious, and statutory theories, such
as theories of defamation and violation of antitrust laws), the steps taken
by the medical staff in implementing the action are a significant point of
analysis because they are the key to HCQIA immunity.
As a relatively new form of hospital-physician alignment, hospital
employment of physicians is not subject to the same degree of regulation
as hospital-physician affiliation through the medical staff.37 To the extent
the law specifically addresses hospital employment of physicians, it
usually does so within state law doctrines pertaining to the “corporate
practice of medicine.” In Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 38
the Illinois Supreme Court aptly summarized the corporate practice of
medicine and its restrictions on employment of physicians:
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits
corporations from providing professional medical
services. Although a few states have codified the
doctrine, the prohibition is primarily inferred from state
medical licensure acts, which regulate the profession of
medicine and forbid its practice by unlicensed
individuals. The rationale behind the doctrine is that a
corporation cannot be licensed to practice medicine
because only a human being can sustain the education,
34
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2013)).
35
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 205, 211–12 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1994)); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2013) (describing the congressional findings relating to
HCQIA).
36
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–11112 (2013) (limiting damages for “professional review
actions” where requirements for notice, hearing, and governing standards are met).
37
Not to be overlooked, employment laws of general applicability, such as antidiscrimination laws, do impose legal requirements onto the hospital-physician
employment relationship. These laws, however, are not unique to this type of
employment relationship.
38
Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997).
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training, and character-screening which are prerequisites
to receiving a professional license. Since a corporation
cannot receive a medical license, it follows that a
corporation cannot legally practice the profession.
The rationale of the doctrine concludes that the
employment of physicians by corporations is illegal
because the acts of the physicians are attributable to the
corporate employer, which cannot obtain a medical
license. The prohibition on the corporate employment of
physicians is invariably supported by several public
policy arguments which espouse the dangers of lay
control over professional judgment, the division of the
physician’s loyalty between his patient and his
profitmaking employer, and the commercialization of the
profession. 39
Critics contend that the complexities of delivering and paying for health
care in the modern era have rendered the legal doctrine an outdated relic
from “when health care was ‘a cottage industry, made up of independent
professionals operating as solo practitioners.’” 40 As the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) concluded in a report on state laws prohibiting hospital
employment of physicians:
[T]he debate over the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine is an argument over who will control the
delivery of medical care. This contention focuses on
whether physicians should make decisions free of
external constraints or whether outside parties (a hospital
administrator, for example) should be able to exert
control over physician behavior. 41
Notably, many states’ corporate practice of medicine doctrine
includes an exception for hospitals to employ physicians. The rationale
for this exception differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; where courts
have taken up the issue, some have reasoned that the public policy
arguments against the corporate practice of medicine—for example, the
commercialization of medicine—do not apply to hospitals organized as
39

Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE
PROHIBITIONS ON HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICIANS, OEI-01-91-00770, at 2 (1991),
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-91-00770.pdf.
41
Id.
40
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charitable institutions, while others have opined that hospital licensing
acts and other laws expressly allow hospitals to offer medical care to
patients. 42 Likewise, the source of these exceptions varies—be it
statutes, 43 court opinions, 44 or state attorney general opinions. 45
Even in these states, however, there may be constraints on the
manner or circumstances in which hospitals may terminate their
employed physicians. This is particularly so in states that regulate
hospital employment of physicians legislatively. For example, in
Colorado, a hospital statutorily may not “limit or otherwise exercise
control over the physician’s independent professional judgment
concerning the practice of medicine or diagnosis or treatment or . . .
require physicians to refer exclusively to the health care facility or to the
health care facility’s employed physicians.”46 Violation of this
prohibition may subject the hospital to regulatory penalties or any
resulting liability to patients or the physician.47 Moreover, a physician
who believes he or she has been the subject of such a violation “has a
right to complain and request review of the matter” pursuant to the
42
Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 111–112 (discussing cases). A small minority of states still
prohibits hospital employment of physicians on corporate practice of medicine grounds.
California is one such state. To achieve the benefits associated with employment of
physicians, such as greater clinical integration and joint contracting with insurers,
California hospitals have pursued various approaches tailored to California’s regulatory
environment. One such approach, for example, involves the operation of clinics by
medical foundations—often hospital affiliate or subsidiary entities which engage
physicians on an independent contractor basis to provide professional services and which
manage the administrative aspects of those physicians’ practices. See DEBRA A. DRAPER
ET AL., CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., A TIGHTER BOND: CALIFORNIA HOSPITALS SEEK
STRONGER TIES WITH PHYSICIANS 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/
MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/T/PDF%
20TighterBondCAHospitalsSeekTiesWithDocs.pdf. Another, somewhat similar approach
entails the structuring of clinics as outpatient hospital departments, where independent
contractor physicians render their professional services, and the hospital furnishes the
“necessary infrastructure and support for operating the clinics, including the physical
space, management, support staff, equipment, supplies, medical records, patient
registration, and facility billing.” Id. at 4. One analysis of these strategies suggested that
while they may offer hospitals a proxy for directly employing physicians, they “may
ultimately add costs to the health care system because of the additional infrastructure
required to operate them.” Id. at 7.
43
See infra note 46.
44
See, e.g., Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 106.
45
See, e.g., 1992 Op. Att’y Gen. Va. 147.
46
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(3) (2014). Other states impose similar statutory
conditions on hospital employment of physicians. See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT.
85/10.8(a)(3); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-42; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-8.1(1); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 63-6-204(f)(1)(A); WIS. STAT. § 448.08(5)(a)(1).
47
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(3); see also, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(c)–
(d) (containing similar provisions).
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hospital’s medical staff bylaws or policies, which “shall ensure that the
due process rights of the parties are protected.” 48 From these provisions,
one can infer that a hospital may not lawfully terminate a physician for
exercising his or her “independent professional judgment” and that if a
termination action appeared to be a smokescreen for restricting such
exercise, the physician would be entitled to minimum procedural
safeguards to validate the basis for the termination.49 The statute does
not, however, presume that no one can stand in judgment of an employed
physician; it implies that any void created by restrictions on hospital
action will be filled by the medical staff, which, as an independent body
comprised of other physicians, can review the propriety of a fellow
physician’s “independent professional judgment.”
Absent these types of statutory protections, the scope of a hospitalemployed physician’s termination rights will depend on the content of
the employment agreement and its relationship to the medical staff
bylaws, as illustrated by the recent Hawaii case of Woodruff v. Hawaii
Pacific Health. 50 In that case, a hospital system terminated a pediatric
hematologist/oncologist in connection with an investigation of the
physician’s billing practices. 51 Because of violations for false billing
claims, the hospital system was a party to a corporate integrity agreement
with the OIG and accordingly had to report to the agency and other
interested parties overpayments and “material deficiencies” in billing
practices. 52 To comply with Medicare regulations, the system’s billing
office instituted a policy prohibiting physicians from billing for certain
invasive procedures performed by a nurse practitioner in the outpatient
48

COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(7); see also, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(a)
(containing similar provisions).
49
This inference is supported by reference to Illinois’ statute authorizing hospital
employment of physicians. It contains review procedures that are similar to those under
the Colorado statute but goes further than that statute by prohibiting “retaliat[ion] against
any employed physician for requesting a hearing or review” under the statute. 210 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(e). By contrast, although state peer review protection statutes
generally do not directly regulate hospital-physician employment arrangements, at least
one court has held that a state statute recognizing the confidentiality of peer review
proceedings impliedly prohibits a hospital from terminating an employee physician
because of the physician’s conduct as a peer reviewer of another physician’s care. See
Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp., No. 34,286, 2015 N.M. LEXIS 51, at *39–41 (N.M.
Feb. 19, 2015) (holding that New Mexico’s peer review confidentiality statute, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5, which impliedly “prohibits an employer from retaliating against a
physician who participates in a peer review because the unlawful acquisition and
utilization of peer review information is a factual prerequisite to such retaliation,” is a
“mandatory rule of law incorporated into physician-reviewer employment contracts”).
50
Woodruff v. Haw. Pac. Health, No. 29447, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26 (Haw. App.
Jan. 14, 2014).
51
See id. at *1–2.
52
See id. at *5.
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hospital setting. 53 The plaintiff physician expressed resistance and
disagreement over the application and interpretation of the policy and, as
an audit and investigation found, had submitted numerous billing claims
that did not meet the standards in the policy. 54 After disclosing these
findings to the OIG and offering to accept the physician’s resignation
(which the physician did not tender), the hospital system terminated the
physician’s employment. 55 The physician’s medical staff privileges were
unaffected by the termination, but shortly thereafter the chief executive
officer of the hospital where she practiced suspended them. 56 On review,
however, the hospital’s medical executive committee ruled that the
suspension was unwarranted and therefore lifted the suspension.57
Among the various causes of action the physician alleged in
litigation following her termination, she argued the hospital bylaws
“were incorporated into [her] employment agreement . . . and therefore
she was entitled to a hearing before her employment was terminated.”58
For support, the physician cited her employment agreement, which
required her to maintain in good standing medical staff membership and
appropriate privileges, and to comply with the medical staff bylaws and
all other rules, regulations, policies, and procedures.59 The agreement

53

See id. at *10.
See id. at *11–14.
55
See id. at *14–17.
56
See id. at *17. The opinion does not specify the grounds for suspension of the
physician’s privileges, but the short gap between termination of the physician’s
employment and suspension of her privileges suggests the underlying reasons for both
actions may have been the same.
57
See id. at *17–18.
58
Id. at *46–47. Where an employer hospital is a public hospital, an employee
physician facing termination may argue that he or she is owed a pre-termination hearing
and other procedural rights as a matter of constitutional due process. For instance, in the
recent case of Winger v. Meade District Hospital, No. 13-1428-JTM, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28234 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 2015), the employee physician asserted that the employer
public hospital violated his right to constitutional due process when it revoked his
temporary medical staff privileges because of a finding of substandard care and then
subsequently terminated his employment. The court rejected this argument on the ground
that the medical staff bylaws and employment agreement did not create “a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest such that the due process protections
were applicable . . . .” Id. at *13 (quoting Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub.
Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008)). As the court noted, the employment
agreement explicitly incorporated the bylaws, which “provide[d] that temporary
privileges, such as those held by [the physician], could be revoked at any time, without
any procedural rights.” Id. at *16. Thus, even for physicians employed by public
hospitals, the scope of termination-related procedural rights available to them will
generally turn on the provisions of the medical staff bylaws and the employment
agreement, as it does for their private-sector counterparts.
59
See Woodruff, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26, at *49–50.
54
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also provided that loss of medical staff membership was “grounds for
automatic and immediate termination of employment . . . .” 60
On appeal, the court held that the employment agreement did not
confer to the physician rights associated with peer review actions under
the medical staff bylaws. 61 To the extent the agreement incorporated
provisions of the bylaws, it did so one-sidedly, in favor of the hospital
system; it conditioned the physician’s employment on compliance with
the bylaws but did not require the hospital system to comply with the
bylaws. 62 Nevertheless, the court went on to note that the hearing
procedures under the bylaws did “not apply to employment terminations,
but only to adverse actions relating to staff membership and clinical
privileges.” 63 Although the employment termination “may have ended
the increased access to hospital facilities [the physician] had as an
employee,” the court concluded “it did not affect the access to and
privileges at [the hospital] she enjoyed as a medical staff member.” 64
Suspension of the physician’s privileges did follow her employment
termination, but she was afforded—and was vindicated by—the medical
staff review process in that action and did not otherwise challenge it in
the litigation.65
As Woodruff shows, while a hearing and other related procedural
rights may be standard course in medical staff peer review actions, such
rights are much more likely to be the exception, and not the norm, in
physician employment termination actions. In those jurisdictions that
prohibit the corporate practice of medicine, or authorize such practice by
hospitals, but subject to certain restrictions, hospitals run the risk of
violating the prohibition—and incurring all the liabilities that come with
doing so—if they terminate or take other adverse action against a
physician’s employment as a means to retaliate against or impinge on the
physician’s independent professional judgment. Otherwise, any
parameters to a hospital’s ability to terminate a physician’s employment
must appear in the employment agreement. Woodruff demonstrates that a
mere citation in an employment agreement to the hospital’s medical staff
60

Id. at *50.
See id. at *51–52.
62
See id. at *50–51.
63
Id. at *51–53; see also Bryant v. Glen Oaks Med. Ctr., 650 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ill.
App. 1995) (making similar observations where a pathologist argued the hearing and
appellate review provisions in the medical staff bylaws applied to the termination of his
medical directorship).
64
Woodruff, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26, at *53; see also Bryant, 650 N.E.2d at 630
(noting the plaintiff physician’s “fail[ure] to appreciate the distinction between his
medical staff privileges and his ability to provide pathology services with the free and
unfettered right to use the pathology laboratory”).
65
Woodruff, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26, at *53.
61
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bylaws is not sufficient to extend the rights therein to employment
termination actions. If a physician is to receive notice, a hearing, or any
other rights with respect to termination of employment, the employment
agreement must enumerate them with specificity.

B.
Reporting Employment Termination Actions to the National
Practitioner Data Bank
The availability of a process to challenge medical staff peer review
actions is important to physicians because it provides a mechanism to
preserve the status quo and stave off losing, in whole or in part, their
medical staff membership or privileges. Insofar as a physician is able to
avail him or herself during such review process, he or she may be able to
avoid an outcome that, in the longer term, may be even worse than losing
his or her medical staff membership or privileges at a particular facility:
a report to the NPDB. As a corollary, one would expect physicians to
advocate fiercely for a hearing and other rights in employment
termination actions if the outcome of the action were reportable to the
NPDB. The question, then, is whether physician employment termination
actions are, in fact, reportable to the NPDB.
The NPDB is a creation of HCQIA. Complementing the immunity
provisions under HCQIA, the NPDB is intended to bolster the integrity
of the peer review process by “accumulating and disseminating data
pertaining to adverse peer review actions which have an impact on the
clinical privileges of physicians and other medical staff members.”66 In
relevant part, HCQIA requires hospitals and other “health care entities”
to report to the NPBD “professional review actions” that “adversely
affect[ ] the clinical privileges of a physician for a period longer than 30
days.” 67 HCQIA’s definition of “professional review action” is
particularly dense, “but the essence of the definition . . . is that it is a
recommendation or an action based on an assessment of ‘the competence
or professional conduct of a physician’ that will have an adverse effect
on such physician’s clinical privileges or membership/appointment in a
professional society.” 68
In the context of analyzing reporting obligations regarding physician
employment termination actions, identifying the potentially reportable
66

RIEGER ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.4, at 16.
42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(A) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(i) (2014). HCQIA
also requires reporting of a physician’s surrender of his or her clinical privileges “while
the physician is under an investigation by the entity relating to possible incompetence or
improper professional conduct, or in return for not conducting such an investigation or
proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(B) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(ii)
(2014)).
68
RIEGER ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.4, at 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (2013)).
67
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“professional review action” is an important threshold task. Is the
employment termination decision itself the potentially reportable action?
Or, where termination of a physician’s medical staff membership or
privileges occurs in tandem with termination of the physician’s
employment, is the termination of the physician’s medical staff
membership or privileges the reportable action (or both)? The first
question generally has been overlooked, which is curious considering
that HCQIA defines “clinical privileges” as not only medical staff
membership and privileges in the ordinary sense, but also “the other
circumstances pertaining to the furnishing of medical care under which a
physician or other licensed health care practitioner is permitted to furnish
such care by a health care entity.” 69 Arguably, this definition is broad
enough to encompass a physician’s status as a hospital employee as an
“other circumstance” to render care in the hospital setting, especially in
light of the fact that so many physicians are opting for employment over
affiliation as an independent practitioner on the medical staff as the
“credential” for practicing medicine within the hospital environment. 70
Perhaps it is assumed that because termination of a physician’s
employment tends to be initiated by hospital administration or human
resources personnel, the employment termination action is not an action
performed by what HCQIA describes as a “professional review body”
engaged in “professional review activity.” 71 If these terms referred only
to medical staff review bodies engaged in medical staff review activity,
then such an assumption would have support. But HCQIA is not so
limited; it specifically includes hospitals and their governing body and
other committees in the definition of “professional review bod[ies]” that
may conduct “professional review activity.” 72 Thus, when one construes
these terms more robustly, and interprets HCQIA’s definition of “clinical
privileges” to capture a physician’s employment status in relation to a
hospital, one could reasonably conclude that HCQIA casts a wide
enough net to require reporting of physician employment termination
actions where the action is “based on the competence or professional
conduct of an individual physician (which conduct affects or could affect
adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients) . . . .” 73 Because
termination of a physician’s employment without cause could meet this

69

42 U.S.C. § 11151(3) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2014).
See supra Part I.
71
See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(10)–(11) (2013) (defining quoted terms); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 60.3 (2014).
72
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11151(10)–(11) (2013) (defining quoted terms); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 60.3 (2014).
73
42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (2013).
70
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basis, 74 even without-cause employment termination actions could be
reportable under this interpretation.
Despite its theoretically broad scope, in practice, HCQIA’s NPDB
provisions have been analyzed more narrowly to discern whether
termination of a physician’s medical staff membership or privileges is
reportable, to the extent it is connected with termination of the
physician’s employment by a hospital. On this issue, conventional
wisdom holds that termination of the physician’s medical staff
membership or privileges is not reportable, at least where the termination
happens automatically following the employment termination action.
Proponents of this view have traditionally pointed to a passage in the
2001 version of the National Practitioner Data Bank Guidebook—a
compilation of guidelines on reporting to and querying from the NPDB
published by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
within HHS—that describes the example of a hospital that has a “system
of professional review established under its bylaws” and an
“employment termination procedure,” the latter of which the hospital
uses “to end a practitioner’s employment without use of the professional
review process,” resulting in revocation of the practitioner’s clinical
privileges. 75 According to this version of the Guidebook, a report on the
revocation of the practitioner’s privileges would be voided “since the
professional review process had not been followed in terminating the
practitioner’s privileges” and “[t]he termination was not a professional
review action.” 76
In April of 2015, HRSA released a much-anticipated updated version
of the Guidebook, in which the agency essentially reiterated its position
from the 2001 iteration. The new Guidebook maintains the distinction
between a “system of professional review established under [a hospital’s]
bylaws” and an “employment termination procedure,” concluding like
the 2001 version that as long as revocation of a practitioner’s privileges
is “not a result of a professional review action,” the revocation is not
reportable. 77 But the Guidebook now clarifies that “if the hospital had
74

See Langenberg v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 1:12-cv-175-NBF, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 166183, at *31-32 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2013) (describing the purpose of a withoutcause provision in a physician’s employment agreement as “not to guarantee that no
cause exists for termination of the contract but, rather, to ensure that each party has the
ability to unilaterally terminate the contract without the need to state a cause. Such
circumstances do not foreclose the possibility that the terminating party might have
reasons for its decision to invoke [the without-cause provision]”).
75
HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NPDB
GUIDEBOOK, at F-9 (2001).
76
Id.
77
HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NPDB
GUIDEBOOK, at E-40 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 GUIDEBOOK].
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performed a professional review of the practitioner’s privileges as a
result of the review, the professional review action would have been
reportable, even if the action started as an employment termination.” 78
This added commentary suggests that a direct connection between an
adverse privileging action and a finding regarding a practitioner’s
competence or professional conduct is necessary to give rise to a
reporting duty; if the privileging action is merely a formality that follows
from an employment termination action, the privileging action is not
reportable, even if the employment termination action itself was related
to the practitioner’s competence or professional conduct.
In an era of increased employment of physicians, where physicians’
employment status and medical staff membership and privileges often
overlap such that termination of employment will cause automatic
termination of medical staff membership and privileges, HRSA’s
continuation of its policy in the 2001 version of the Guidebook should
come as a welcome development for hospitals and physicians alike.
Indeed, prior to issuance of the revised Guidebook in 2015, one
reasonably could have surmised that HRSA might change its
enforcement posture, as the agency has indicated that underreporting of
professional review actions by hospitals is the “next compliance
effort” 79; to the extent more physicians are trading traditional medical
staff affiliation for employment, and such underreporting is attributable
to hospitals not reporting employment-related actions, physician
employment termination actions conceivably could have become an area
of renewed interest for HRSA.
The risks of litigation that a hospital may assume in not following
HRSA’s now years-long guidance on reporting employment terminationrelated actions are on full display in the recent Pennsylvania federal
district court case of Langenberg v. Warren General Hospital. 80
78

Id. (emphasis added).
See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2014), http://www.
npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2012NPDBAnnualReport.pdf (noting “a robust plan to
conduct educational outreach activities targeted at specific audiences associated with
hospital compliance involving querying and reporting to the Data Bank”); see also
Hospital Reporting—The Next Compliance Effort, THE DATA BANK (Aug. 2012),
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/enews/Aug2012enews.jsp (noting “the next phase of our
compliance initiative–the Hospital Compliance Effort”). According to HRSA data, at the
start of 2011, forty-seven percent of hospitals had never reported revoking or restricting a
physician’s clinical privileges to the NPDB. See Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen,
Thousands of Doctors Practicing Despite Errors, Misconduct, USA TODAY, Aug. 20,
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/20/doctors-licenses-medicalboards/2655513/.
80
Langenberg v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 1:12-cv-175-NBF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
166183 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2013).
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Following complaints the physician had raised about patient safety and
quality of care, the hospital in that case terminated the employment of a
vascular surgeon only months into the employment, citing the withoutcause provision in the employment agreement. 81 Pursuant to the
hospital’s medical staff bylaws, the physician’s medical staff
membership and privileges terminated automatically and immediately
upon termination of his employment. 82 A month later, the hospital filed a
report with the NPDB “stating that [the physician] had been terminated
because, inter alia, he ‘often lacked civility and was demeaning to
Hospital staff,’ which had a ‘disruptive and detrimental effect on the
Hospital’s working environment.’” 83 The NPDB report further stated that
the bases for the report were the physician’s “‘failure to comply with
corrective action plan,’ ‘abusive conduct toward staff,’ and ‘disruptive
conduct.’” 84 During the course of the physician’s employment, however,
the hospital never disciplined him for any misconduct or provided him
with any corrective action plan.85 After submission of the NPDB report,
the physician struggled to obtain other employment. 86
In the federal lawsuit that ensued, the physician asserted a litany of
causes of action, all of which were premised on the hospital’s allegedly
improper filing of the NPDB report. 87 Among them, the physician
asserted three breach-of-contract claims that were rooted in the hospital’s
failure to afford the physician any procedural rights before reporting to
the NPDB. 88 The governing “contract” for these claims was the
employment agreement and the bylaws. As to the bylaws claims, the
physician first argued that the hospital breached by submitting the NPDB
report despite language in the bylaws stating that automatic termination
of a physician’s medical staff membership and privileges resulting from
the expiration or termination of a “contractual relationship” with the
hospital was not an “adverse action,” which would implicate the fair

81

See id. at *2–7.
See id. at *3.
83
Id. at *3 (citation omitted). The opinion is not entirely clear as to whether the
hospital reported the employment termination action or the consequent termination of the
physician’s medical staff membership and privileges to the NPDB. But the court’s
characterization of the physician’s legal assertions suggests the hospital reported the
latter. See id. at *20 (noting the physician “maintains that the Hospital breached the
Bylaws by treating his automatic termination of staff membership and clinical privileges
as an ‘adverse action’ for NPDB reporting purposes”).
84
Id. at *3.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
See id. at *6.
88
See id.
82
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hearing plan in the bylaws. 89 Relatedly, the physician contended that the
hospital breached the bylaws by “failing to afford him due process
procedures ‘pursuant to a professional review action,’ including notice of
the charges against him, a hearing at which he could contest the charges,
and an opportunity to appeal any unfavorable ruling.’” 90 With respect to
the employment agreement, the physician argued that the hospital
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein by
submitting the NPDB report “in the absence of due process measures and
after having informed [the physician] that his termination was on a ‘noncause basis.’” 91
On a motion to dismiss, the court rejected all the physician’s breachof-contract claims. The defect in his first count was that there was “no
ambiguity in the Bylaws concerning the fact that the automatic and
immediate loss of clinical privileges and staff membership which results
from a termination of the physician’s employment contract (as was the
case here) [wa]s not an ‘adverse action’ giving rise to due process
hearing procedures.” 92 The physician apparently attempted to equate the
bylaws term “adverse action” with the HCQIA term “professional review
action”—so as to implicate the HCQIA procedures associated with the
latter term—but by doing so he necessarily had to look outside the
“operative contractual document” and therefore could not state a viable
claim for breach of contract. 93 For the same reason, the alternative
bylaws breach claim “fare[d] no better.” 94 As the bylaws were clear that
termination of a physician’s employment would prompt the loss of his or
her medical staff membership and privileges, the physician was
“unwarranted” in his “attempt to infuse meaning into the Bylaws’ use of
the term ‘adverse actions’ by referencing the HCQIA’s
definitions . . . .” 95 In a similar vein, the court held that the hospital could
not have violated an implied duty under the employment agreement when
it exercised its express right to terminate the agreement without cause.96
Any contention of the physician with the NPDB report that followed
from the termination was, according to the court, an effort to “(once
again) conflat[e] [the hospital’s] statutory responsibilities and reporting
requirements under the HCQIA with its contractual obligations under the

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See id. at *13–15.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id.
See id. at *10–11.
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Employment Agreement and thereby graft[ ] additional obligations onto
the Employment Agreement that do not appear in that document.”97
Although Langenberg does not speak to whether employment
termination actions against physicians are reportable to the NPDB, it at
least shows that the practice of hospitals reporting such actions is not
unprecedented, even where the hospital did not extend HCQIA’s
procedural safeguards to the physician who is the subject of the report.
Like Woodruff, the case further reinforces the primacy of the
employment agreement and medical staff bylaws in governing disputes
arising from a hospital terminating a physician’s employment.
Ultimately, if a physician is to be afforded any procedural rights to
challenge an action that may generate an NPDB report, the employment
agreement or medical staff bylaws must ensure that those rights are
available.

III.

PRACTICE POINTERS

The success of hospital employment of physicians as a form of
hospital-physician alignment will turn, in no small part, on the
contingencies hospitals and physicians have in place to resolve potential
conflicts. It may seem somewhat counterintuitive and adversarial to
make issues regarding termination a particular point of focus, but by
reaching common ground on these issues at an early stage, hospitals and
physicians can better avoid confusion about their rights and obligations,
and mitigate the likelihood of disputes escalating like those in Woodruff
and Langenberg.
At the outset, hospitals and physicians considering the employment
model should identify and articulate their negotiating positions on due
process rights related to termination and where on the continuum they
can compromise. One might expect physicians to advocate for as many
procedural rights as they can get, while hospitals, wanting maximum
flexibility, would push for the opposite. But the negotiation need not be
so partisan and polarized. One potential middle-ground approach is to
demarcate rights associated with “with-cause” termination from those
rights associated with “without-cause” termination.
As to the former, the parties may consider enumerating the grounds
for with-cause termination by the hospital to include issues involving
quality of care or patient safety. If the hospital desires to terminate on
one of these grounds, it could provide the physician a notice of its intent
to terminate and an opportunity for the physician to respond in some type
of review forum. The review forum could be conducted through the
97

Id. at *10.
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medical staff, as the American Medical Association (AMA) proposes in
opining on with-cause termination of physician employment agreements,
with the physician receiving “full due process under the medical staff
bylaws” and a stay on the termination until after the “governing body has
acted on the recommendation of the medical staff.” 98 Alternatively, the
review process could be a scaled-down version of a peer review
proceeding, perhaps entailing a combination of medical staff and hospital
human resources functions. As one commentator suggests: “[E]ven if a
full-blown, formal peer review process never occurs, hospitals can at
least attempt to approximate one by offering a review by the medical
staff, and some opportunity for physicians to present their sides of the
story.” 99
Contrary to what they might expect, hospitals could reap a number of
legal benefits by affording their employed physicians an opportunity to
challenge a termination action for quality-of-care or patient safety
concerns. For one, if the process and resulting decision are structured to
fit within HCQIA’s statutory terms—that is, the outcome is a
“professional review action” that meets the statute’s notice, hearing, and
governing standard requirements, taken by a “professional review body”
during the course of “professional review activity” 100—then the hospital
and review process participants could arguably receive immunity from
damages. Thus, the hospital could mitigate its liability stemming from
allegations that a termination action was wrongful or gave rise to other
contractual or tortious causes of action. Plus, the hospital could much
more definitively conclude that the termination action was a reportable
“professional review action.” 101 In similar fashion, by conducting review
98

See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT § 3(e) (2014).
Susan O. Scheutzow & Sean P. Malone, No-Cause Terminations and Data Bank
Reports: Does a No-Cause Termination Mean No Lawsuit?, MEDSTAFF NEWS (Am.
Health Lawyers Ass’n. Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2014, at 7.
100
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11151(9)–(11) (defining quoted terms) (2013); see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 60.3 (2014). As with reporting of physician employment termination actions to the
NPDB, immunity from damages for such actions would turn on a finding that the
physician’s employment status constitutes “clinical privileges” under HCQIA. See supra
Part II.B.
101
See supra Part II.B; see also supra note 100. To be sure, compliance with HCQIA’s
due process provisions is not a prerequisite to reporting a professional review action. See
Leal v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 620 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
42 U.S.C. § 11112, “which sets out standards that professional review actions must
comply with in order for those who participate in them to be immune from liability for
money damages in suits brought by disciplined physicians, . . . does not govern when a
summary suspension, which is a type of professional review action, is reportable”);
Robert R. Harrison, Reporting the Summary Suspension of Medical Staff Privileges:
Requirements, Sanctions, and Interpretive Challenges, MEDSTAFF NEWS (Am. Health
Lawyers Ass’n. Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2015, at 4 (“For NPDB reporting purposes, hospitals
99
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activity through bodies that act as peer review committees, the hospital
could, depending on the applicable state law, privilege from discovery or
admissibility in litigation the communications and documents that are
generated during the review process.102 Finally, a review process that
removes the hospital from directly passing judgment on a physician’s
provision of medical care could shield the hospital from charges of
engaging in the corporate practice of medicine. 103
By contrast, negotiating physician rights relating to without-cause
termination may be more challenging because without-cause termination
is inherently supposed to be hassle-free. The AMA looks upon withoutcause termination with some skepticism, advising physicians to
“carefully consider the potential benefits and harms of entering into
employment agreements containing without cause termination
provisions” and to ensure that these provisions are not a vehicle for the
employer hospital to terminate for reasons relating to “quality, patient
safety, or any other matter that could trigger the initiation of disciplinary
action by the medical staff.” 104 For hospitals, however, the ability to
terminate a physician’s employment without cause is often critical,
providing a mechanism “to part ways with allegedly trouble-making
physicians with no questions asked, without a costly peer review process,
have relied on an underlying HCQIA function—the granting of immunity for
professional review actions—to support the interpretation that no report is required in the
absence of a professional review action, but the guidance has not been explicit on that
point.”). In Langenberg, the physician argued to the contrary—that, by deeming
automatic revocation of a physician’s privileges following termination of an employment
agreement with the hospital as outside the ambit of an “adverse action” subject to a
hearing, the hospital’s medical staff bylaws expressed the position that such revocations
lack the indicia of a “professional review action” that satisfies the procedural standards
for immunity under HCQIA and therefore were not reportable to the NPDB. See
Langenberg, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166183, at *15–22. The court did not rule on the merits of
whether the hospital properly reported to the NPDB, instead limiting its conclusion only
to the determination that the hospital did not breach the terms of the medical staff bylaws
by making the report. See id. at *20–22. The ruling leaves open the possibility that the
physician could initiate HCQIA’s administrative procedures for challenging the
substance of the hospital’s NPDB report. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.16 (2014) (enumerating
procedures for disputing the accuracy of NPDB information). Indeed, it appears the
physician did take this course, as the court later stayed the proceeding while the physician
moved forward with an administrative proceeding and subsequent district court action
against HHS involving the NPDB report. See Langenberg v. Papalia, Civil Action No.
12-175 Erie, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133941 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2014).
102
See RIEGER ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.4, at 9 n.12 (collecting state statutes). Federal
law, however, would provide no analogous peer review privilege. See, e.g., Agster v.
Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that HCQIA “granted
immunity to participants in medical peer reviews, but did not privilege the report
resulting from the process”).
103
See supra Part II.A.
104
AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT § 3(f) (2014).
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and without having to make a [NPDB] report that can generate lawsuits
for defamation, interference with business relationships, or bad-faith peer
review.” 105
Short of scrapping without-cause termination rights altogether, there
are a number of aspects of the without-cause termination provision that
hospitals and physicians could negotiate. The period of any notice prior
to such termination would be an obvious target. Linkage of the
physician’s employment status with his or her medical staff membership
and privileges—such that termination of the employment triggers
termination of the physician’s medical staff membership and
privileges—may be another point of deliberation. As a practical matter, a
physician’s medical staff membership and privileges may be meaningless
after termination of employment, but by decoupling them from the
physician’s employment status, the hospital could effectively put the
physician on notice that his or her employment status and medical staff
affiliation are distinct and that termination of employment will implicate
only those rights under the employment agreement.
Severing the connection between the physician’s employment status
and medical staff affiliation could also ward off the quandary of the
hospital having to determine whether to report to the NPDB termination
of the physician’s medical staff membership and privileges automatically
occurring because of termination of the physician’s employment. 106 Even
in those arrangements where the physician’s medical staff membership
and privileges and employment status remain synchronized, the parties
could bargain for a representation that the hospital will not report to the
NPDB an automatic termination of the physician’s medical staff
membership or privileges. While it is generally correct, as the hospital
argued in Langenberg, that a hospital’s “reporting requirements under
the HCQIA are not a matter that could be altered, waived, or otherwise
bargained away through a contractual arrangement between [a h]ospital
and a physician,” 107 HRSA’s guidance in the Guidebook suggests that
such a representation would be acceptable because the automatic
termination of the physician’s medical staff membership or privileges
would not be a “professional review action” that would implicate the
statute. 108
Ultimately, whatever terms the parties agree to, they should make
sure to draft them with precision in the employment agreement. This may
seem like an obvious point, but it warrants emphasis given the
105

Scheutzow & Malone, supra note 99, at 5.
See supra Part II.B.
107
Langenberg v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 1:12-cv-175-NBF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
166183, at *21-22 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2013).
108
See 2015 GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at E-40; supra Part II.B.
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448

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:425

“[m]ultiple layers of contractual relationship between the parties . . . .” 109
References to the medical staff bylaws and related rules, regulations,
policies, and procedures will be particularly important and should prompt
review of the specific documents or provisions being referenced and
determination of whether they track the terminology from relevant laws,
such as HCQIA (as was not the case in Langenberg, to the physician’s
detriment). Uses of “[l]anguage such as making the employment
agreement ‘subject to,’ ‘except as otherwise stated,’ or ‘except as
otherwise permitted’ by the bylaws” may create the situation,
intentionally or unintentionally “where the terms of the employment
agreement are superseded.” 110 Yet, as Woodruff cautions physicians,
even broadly worded requirements in the employment agreement for the
physician to comply with the medical staff bylaws are generally
insufficient, on their own, to render the procedures for medical staff peer
review actions applicable to employment-based actions. 111
Finally, the impetus is on hospitals to think through the propriety and
consequences of terminating a physician’s employment before doing so.
Termination is a drastic measure, and as such, it may not be the
appropriate response to remediate a problem with a physician.
Particularly where a hospital has clinical concerns, the hospital may find
that the medical staff framework—with all the corrective action powers
at the medical staff’s disposal, such as the authority to convene
investigative committees and subject a physician with deficiencies to
peer supervision—may be more conductive to resolving the problem. As
noted, moreover, going the medical staff route may have the added
benefits of ensuring certain legal protections are in place and accruing
physician buy-in toward the employment model. On the other hand, a
quick, clean severance may sometimes be appropriate, such as where the
physician is creating a disruption for other staff. Termination of the
physician’s employment, potentially along with the physician’s medical
staff membership and privileges, may be proper then.
In addition to the operational factors that will shape employment
termination decisions, larger market forces will also critically affect the
contentiousness of these decisions. For physicians in the post-health
reform system, “it will be harder to revert to private practice if
relationships sour, since new payment structures and care models will
make it increasingly difficult for traditional private practices to remain
109
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profitable.” 112 Indeed, “[e]mployment choices that physicians make
today may not be able to be undone.” 113 Acknowledging this reality,
hospitals should likely anticipate more challenges to their employment
termination decisions, leading to the types of assertions in Woodruff and
Langenberg that various procedures must be exhausted before the
termination decision can take effect. As a spillover effect for hospitals,
messy employment termination actions could undermine among already
employed physician staff the very sense of collaboration and
coordination that the employment relationship is meant to engender, and
deter employment of other physicians. Clearly, termination of the
hospital-physician employment relationship is not a matter to be taken
lightly.

IV. CONCLUSION
Hospital employment of physicians continues to take further root in
the healthcare landscape, yet the voluntary medical staff structure
remains intact. Hospitals and physicians accordingly will have to
confront questions about the physician’s dual roles as hospital employee
and medical staff member, and the rights and responsibilities that attach
to one role and carry over to the other. The pre-employment negotiation
will be the best opportunity for the parties to sort through and reach
consensus on these issues, including the applicability of traditional peer
review protections in the medical staff context to employment
termination actions and the duty to report such actions to the NPDB.
Although the employment model is intended to give hospitals greater
flexibility and control of physicians’ practice, hospitals are well advised
to consider some type of pre-termination review process for their
employed physicians, particularly in circumstances that involve clinical
practice issues. Doing so could have a number of longer-term legal
advantages and shore up goodwill among physicians. Once they have
agreed to a set of terms, the parties should draft them carefully in writing
in the employment agreement, avoiding vague, overly broad references
to extra-contractual documents, such as the medical staff bylaws, which
could muddle the parties’ understanding about which document
supersedes the others. If and when the time comes to terminate a
physician’s employment, hospitals should make sure a thorough
decision-making process is in place, requiring due consideration of the
reasons for the termination; any available alternatives, including
disciplinary action initiated through the medical staff; and the risks of
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liability. Taken together, these steps could go a long way toward
facilitating the spirit of partnership the hospital-physician employment
model is supposed to promote.

